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West Europe Report

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WEST EUROPE REPORT

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ARMS CONTROL BELGIUM

CONTRIBUTION TO NATO, PURCHASE OF PATRIOT MISSILES

Brussels KNACK in Dutch 23 May 84 pp 19-20

[Article by F.D.M.: "A Blow in Evere"; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in italics]

[Text] The reports about new weapons systems and the reduction in the Belgian contribution to NATO's infrastructure kept the debates that are most critical to us out of the news last week: the ones about the acquisition of Patriot missiles.

It was almost a quarter to six in the evening when NATO Secretary General Joseph Luns rather abruptly concluded the meeting of the fourteen ministers of defense of the Atlantic alliance (excluding France and Iceland) on Wednesday, 16 May in order that they all might go dine with their Belgian colleague Freddy Vreven (Party of Liberty and Progress). Ironically, fate would have it that the Belgian Ministry of National Defense would pay for more than the food that day: all the plans that the Vreven cabinet had made during the preceding months had been neatly swept from the table, and that threatens to cost our country several billion francs.

As this newspaper reported at great length on 2 May, NATO heard from the Belgian Ministry of National Defense at the end of 1982 that, notwithstanding all the available studies by the high command of the allied forces in Europe (SHAPE), Belgium

--would still withdraw its / (Improved-) Hawk/missiles from Germany, --that these would then be deployed in our country as /SHORAD (short range air defense)/for the defense of air-and seaports,

-- that the more powerful, but older, /Nike/missiles (potentially armed with nuclear warheads) would gradually be phased out,

-- that no /Patriot/missiles would replace them,

-- that no new SHORAD systems would be purchased, and

-- that there could thus be no more discussion of defending the Belgian harbors by means of SHORAD.

As has become well known in the meantime, the Vreven cabinet unilaterally finished four of the eight Nike squadrons in mid-1983 (of which a number had been modernized in the meantime at a cost of one billion francs),

the staff of which was in some instances sent home as many as two times, and for this and other reasons the cabinet further incurred the resentment of a number of NATO allies.

It indeed looked as though such an otherwise cautious defense minister had suddenly kicked over the traces. The more so that his cabinet chief Joel De Smet (a retired artillery colonel) for his part left top American government officials simmering for months, in a manner incomprehensible to them. However this style of diplomacy, highly unusual for Belgium, the government and the Party of Liberty and Progress, had the disadvantage of ultimately being good for nothing.

On Tuesday 15 May Defense Minister Vreven relatively discreetly informed NATO Secretary General Maurice Gysemberg general chief of staff of the Belgium army,

--that Belgium will keep its I-Hawk missiles in place in Germany after all, --that the purchase of SHORAD air defense system is still anticipated, though not until after 1990.

-- that the four remaining Nike squadrons will be kept until they are replaced by Patriot systems, and

-- that in one way or another Belgium will indeed then purchase the Patriot system.

Difficult Position

That's not all. It is assumed that Belgium is actually going to buy six and not four Patriot firing units (thus, a matter of 160 missiles), at a cost of a good 30 billion francs.

In this respect it would appear that Defense Minister Vreven was at least entertaining illusions when he-as on Thursday 17 May, after the NATO summit meeting in Evere concerning, among other things, the Belgian Radio and Television (Dutch Service)—declared that our country would not have to pay for the Patriots.

It now appears that Belgium will receive them on loan from the Americans during the first phase (1987-1992) but will have to man them with its own military and at its own cost. During a second phase (after 1992), when the Patriot manufacturer Raytheon has finished supplying the American, German and Dutch military forces, Belgium would then receive new Patriots, or—as is likely—would keep and pay for the missiles it had received on loan.

Moreover, should Belgium not succeed—and this, too, is almost certain—in obtaining a good price for the missiles, which would indeed be five years old by then, then it will come down to our little country simply making a gift of six new Patriot firing units to the United States. The Vreven cabinet is probably capable of that, too.

All of this was made quite clear during the Vreven cabinet chief De Smet's brief visit to Washington on 11 May and then again behind the closed doors of the NATO summit meeting in Evere last week.

Among other things, it was again made obvious just what a difficult position cabinet chief De Smet has really put our country in at the Military Committee meeting on Tuesday 15 May, with almost all the chiefs of staff of the member nations under the direction of the Dutch four-star General De Jager; even if the intervention of the American four-star General William Rogers, supreme commander of the allied forces in Europe, does fit clearly into the Raytheon sales strategy.

However, the Belgian/advocates of ground defenses/, who now have things their own way at Defense in the person of Cabinet Chief De Smet and Chief of Staff Gysemberg, have--in their attempts to deny the Air Force its Patriot missiles--achieved completely the opposite effect.

The Air Force will still receive the Patriots, will receive even more than they expected and earlier, too. But more will also have to be paid for them than was anticipated.

For example, if this purchase goes accordingly the now widely reported /leasing/ formula, then it would moreover appear that the industry will receive no socio-economic compensation for it at all.

In contrast, purchase of the SHORAD systems could well have provided for compensation, but they have been put off until 1990 and later.

That thispurchase has remained a priority since 1977 in order, among other things, to keep the Belgian military planes from being destroyed on the ground as happened in May 1940, and that one way or another the SHORAD missiles will be required to protect further the cruise missiles at the Florennes air force base, obviously does not matter to national defense. Nonetheless, these problems are no more than those which have resulted all along from the age-old rivalry between the land and air forces.

The procurement and above all payment for the Patriots not only requires revision of the so-called /personnel plan/ of Defense Minister Vreven but, according to some, has already threatened replacement of the Leopard-I tanks in the nineties. It is after all quite predictable that the Wallonian-Brussels and even Flemish aviation lobbies will then also see to it that the last Mirages are again replaced by F-16 fighter bombers, and that in themeantime this billion franc program will not have to yield to tanks, helicopters, or any land forces program whatsoever.

12620

CSO: 3614/96

BRIEFS

NEW LEFTIST POLITICAL PARTY--The chairman of the Seamen's Association, Preben Moller Hansen, is concentrating now on having his political interest, the Common Course Club, recreated into a real political party. At a national management meeting yesterday he presented a draft of a political program for the party which will finally be approved next autumn. The Common Course Club today has 1500 members. Preben Moller Hansen calls the Social Democratic Party a nonsocialist party and SF [Socialist People's Party] is reduced to a leftwing Social Democratic Party. He compares VS [Left-Socialist Party] with youth groups in the Colored Clump, and says that his own former party--the DKP [Danish Communist Party]--has lost its credibility. Therefore he says there is a need for a new party on the left. [Text] [Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 24 Jun 84 p 10] 9287

CSO: 3613/182

DROP IN SOVIET APPLICATIONS FOR RESEARCH SHIP VISITS

Reykjavík MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 3 Jun 84 p 48

[Article: "Thirty-Five Research Permits to Foreigners This Year: No Soviet Research Here This Year"]

[Text] The research by the Soviets within the Icelandic economic zone has been considerable in recent years when considering the number of Soviet research ships off the Icelandic coast. This summer, however, it seems that there will not be much Soviet research off the Icelandic coast according to information MORGUNBLADID has obtained from the Foreign Ministry as no Soviet research vessel has been granted a permit to conduct research within the Icelandic economic zone in the near future.

Minister Counselor Tomas Karlsson at the Foreign Ministry said that this year only one Soviet research ship has been granted a permit to dock at an Icelandic port and that was in January. This ship only stopped for three days to get supplies and water and this particular ship was not conducting research within the Icelandic economic zone and only docked for the aforementioned purposes.

Karlsson said that in 1982 nine Soviet research vessels had been conducting research within the Icelandic economic zone and last year five Soviet ships had been conducting research here. But so far, Soviet research vessels has been granted a permit to conduct research within the Icelandic economic zone this summer.

The National Research Council said that no Soviet research group was expected this year. National Research Council Administrator Gunnar Bjorn Jonsson said that already 35 research permits had been issued to foreign groups this summer and so far no application had been received from the Soviets to conduct research in the country this summer. Jonasson said that the countries that had applied for permits to conduct research here this summer were the same as in previous years, i.e., the Nordic countries, the United States, France and West Germany. Jonsson said that he did not expect any research expeditions from the Soviet Union this summer.

9583

CSO: 3626/25

FELDT AT CENTER OF GROWING FEUD BETWEEN SDP. LABOR

LO Sees Power Eroding

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 17 Jun 84 p 8

[Commentary by Bo A. Ericsson]

[Text] The influence and sympathy of the Swedish Federation of Trade Unions within Kanslihuset [Swedish government office building] have decreased. This has happened gradually and concurrently with the economic upswing. Stig Malm's sharp attack on the government during the past week is an indication of the open power struggle which is now going on between the leadership of the Swedish Federation of Trade Unions and the government.

It is not every day that a chairman of the Swedish Federation of Trade Unions makes a statement such as the following one on a Social Democratic government, in public and to the press, radio and TV:

"Some kind of internal competition has begun among the members of the government to express as controversial viewpoints as possible, preferably with as little association with the party program and decisions of the congress as possible."

These were the bitter words of Stig Malm at the congress of the Social Democratic Youth Organization, held in Stockholm last week.

The members of the Social Democratic Youth Organization agreed and applauded him.

Malm did not mention any names but everybody knew that he had in mind Minister of Finance Kjell-Olof Feldt.

Feldt knew that as well. The following day, he added in an interview to DAGENS NYHETER:

"Stig Malm ought to safeguard his own job."

When the Chairman of the Swedish Federation of Trade Unions and the Social Democratic Minister of Finance express themselves in this way, the outside world can hardly help asking:

What Is Happening?

What is happening within the Social Democratic Party? Are there things which go beyond the things with which the book of interviews "Conversations with Feldt" is concerned?

The book of interviews, written by Social Democratic chief editors Berndt Ahlqvist and Lars Engqvist (sold out immediately, new edition in circulation) contains statements by Feldt on various subjects, such as private childcare, the public sector, marginal tax rates, and the tax on gross sales of manufacturers. It has brought about an outcry within certain sections of the party (the debate, strangely enough, started already before the publication of the book and was based on a press summary).

The Social Democratic Union of Swedish Women, for example, compared Feldt to Adelsohn and called out: Have you lost your ideology? Several branches of the Social Democratic Youth Organization demanded: Resign. Feldt!

In criticizing "certain" members of the government in the course of his speech to the Social Democratic Youth Organization, Stig Malm mentioned neither the name of Feldt nor the book of interviews.

That is not strange. Social Democratic reviewers also find that the book of interviews is but part of a larger complex. What it is actually all about is some kind of open power struggle between the leadership of the Swedish Federation of Trade Unions and the government.

Out of Touch

This is the way the background is described:

It is today felt within the leadership of the Swedish Federation of Trade Unions that they remain out of touch with developments. For one thing, the Swedish Federation of Trade Unions has essentially lost its control over the collective bargaining and has vast problems holding on to its membership. For the other, the influence of the Swedish Federation of Trade Unions with the government has declined. Despite various advances, the Swedish Federation of Trade Unions, for example, has not gained any appreciable hearing for its demands for a more expansive economic policy with a view to reducing the unemployment rate. (The same demands have been raised by the Swedish Central Organization of Salaried Employees.)

What has instead happened is that, concurrently with the economic upswing, the government has developed more stamina. Especially the positions of Feldt and the Ministry of Finance have become strengthened. As an ombudsman put it, Feldt is now 'on his way to becoming a hero among the broad masses of the Social Democratic Party.

The contrast to the situation which prevailed during the opposition years as well as during the period immediately following the change of government is marked. At the time, the Swedish Federation of Trade Unions controlled a substantial portion of the party's policy.

New Situation

The pendulum thus now keeps swinging. Now it is the market-oriented pragmatists, the economic experts, not the radicals, the visionaries who are leading the debate within the party.

It is primarily the pragmatists who are carrying on the reappraisal—of methods, not objectives—which is now taking place within the party. Their basic idea is that it will not do merely to continue from where they had to stop in 1976 and carry on on the basis of the policy pursued during the years in opposition. A new situation has arisen, old instruments do not function the way they used to do, and an adjustment will have to take place. That is the message.

At the same time, there are leading Social Democrats who discuss an increased sharp distinction between the party and the trade union movement. That will presumably lead to less influence on the part of labor.

That is how part of the reasoning goes.

When, at the congress of the Social Democratic Youth C ratination, Stig Malm launched a counterattack on this development, he did not turn against Feldt personally but against "the very phenomen," as it is called by Labor: of reappraising old fundamental value judgments, of relaxing fundamental principles, without indicating new ways, of adopting accidental courses. This creates a dangerous uncertainty within the ranks of the party, says Malm.

We have got to know where we stand.

Malm is supported by several chairmen of unions, among them Sigvard Marjasin of the Municipal Employee Section of the Swedish Central Organization of Salaried Employees, the largest union within the Federation of Trade Unions, who, in a commentary, talked about "rational editors" (i.e. Ahlqvist-Engqvist).

However, some sources say that Malm has "a silent support" also among some members of the government.

Geijer Scolded

The fact that the leadership of the Federation of Trade Unions and a Social Democratic government are not entirely in agreement is no new phenomenon and should not be overrated. The political and union tranches within the labor movement have always had different roles, it is pointed out within the Federation of Trade Unions. Arne Geijer, for example, would sometimes become extremely angry with the government and would scold it for hours.

However, this would happen behind closed doors. Hardly anything would expire.

This where the great difference is: today, differences of opinion are discussed openly, for the reason, among others, that Malm is regarded as having a need for shaping the Federation of Trade Unions in a situation where the conomic

cake is not growing as previously, and it, for several years, primarily has been a question of distributing cuts in real wages.

When the Social Democratic Party was in opposition, some kind of state of emergency prevailed. At the time, there was a common, definable enemy, and their roles intermingled.

How big a support does Stig Malm's criticism of the government have among the broad masses of the Social Democratic Party?

There is hardly a clear-cut answer to that question. However, a number of talks with, among others, active Social Democrats in the party districts, municipal government members and local trade union representatives do, indeed, provide certain guidelines.

Feldt Popular

In the first place, the claim is generally made that Kjell-Olof Feldt today is very popular among the membership of the party. His position is said to have become gradually reinforced after the change of government and especially pari passu with the economic upswing-despite heretical stories about wage-earner funds and statements of "madmen" being involved in the collective bargaining.

"He is a rock," some say. "He is today No. 2 in the party," others say. "He is knowledgeable like Strang but more open for dialogue than he was," still others say.

In the second place, most people find that Feldt's position has not deteriorated as a result of the book of interviews and the personal, sometimes unorthodox ideas which he presents in the book.

"We need this debate and the overhaul of the policy. We have far too long failed to take a position on several issues," one municipal commissioner says.

"Feldt's frankness makes a favorable impression and may persuade Social Democrats who have joined nonsocialist parties to come back to the party," somebody else says.

To the Right

An editorial in the Social Democratic STOCKHOLMS-TIDNINGEN last Thursday seems to convey more or less the same line of thought. What is the use of these outbursts of abuse, the paper laments, appearing to be of the opinion that they hurt Malm himself more than the government and Feldt.

However, at the same time, there are active Social Democrats around the country who, in warning, say more or less as follows:

"There has been a shift to the right within the party, but lately it has been checked. Feldt has now reached some kind of limit. He ought not to go any farther than he has done and not to overestimate himself."

Palme did not get an opportunity to read the book of interviews before it was published and is said to have been somewhat annoyed because of it. At the same time, he has called the book "extraordinary," even if he added that he may not share all of Feldt's viewpoints.

Even if it is the successful economic policy which has given Feldt his strong position and the increased respect heis enjoying, it is, at the same time, his big problem.

What has happened during the past & months is that the crisis awareness has decreased noticeably. The wage increases have become larger than expected, and right now a wage drift is taking place which, especially in export enterprises with big profits, seems to go beyond all limits.

Wild Strikes

Wagelevels have often been raised after wild strikes -- a whole series of such is sweeping over the country right now.

Already today, it seems as if wage levels have been pushed upwards to such high levels that will not be possible to stay within the limits set for the inflation next year.

In that case, the unemployment rate will begin to increase anew. Such a trend is the government's nightmare. It would be a disaster for the Social Democratic Party in an election year.

At the same time, there are now only 4 months left before the Social Democratic party congress. By then, the differences of opinion between the government and the leadership of the Federation of Trade Unions will have to be settled. Bury the hatchet, AFTONBLADET, among others, warns.

If they do not succeed in doing this, the congress will become a dramatic one.

Paper on Feldt, Malm Conflict

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 15 Jun 84 p 2

[Editorial: "Malm-Feldt Conflict"/

[Text] One may have an idea of the kind of conversation between Kjell-Olof Feldt and Stig Malm of which the public controversy between them is an extension. A chairman of the Federation of Trade Unions and a Social Democratic minister of finance would hardly behave in this way unless the relations between them had already been strained to the limit.

From the technical point of view, Feldt is the superior one. He is pedagogical, realistic, and unprejudiced, while Malm, to a serious degree, resorts to cliches and slogans.

However, it is important to seek to find out what the dispute actually originates in. The tension between the government and the Federation of Trade Unions is not caused by Stig Malm. It is intimately related to the strategy chosen by the government for its economic policy. A different policy would, no doubt, also have caused difficulties in the relations with the Federation of Trade Unions. The government, however, has now prepared the ground for a particularly serious division within the movement.

Some time prior to the election in 1982, Olof Palme and Kjell-Olof Feldt decided to seek to restore the vigor of the trades and industries by way of a public devaluation. This was tantamount to relying on a monetary illusion. The society would more readily accept a reduction of the standard of living if it takes place through an inflation rather than being requested directly. The profits within the trades and industries were forced upwards without anything being done at the same time to solve the structural problems and the disequilibriums which caused a number of previous devaluations. The operation was undertaken while relying on the loyalty of the trade unions. Wage earners were not to be allowed to compensate for the increase in profits released by the devaluation.

However, it was known from many previous peaks of booms what kind of internal temptations such a situation subjects the trade unions to. Do not forget the ore field conflict in 1969-70 and the wave of wild strikes which followed: Every boom tends to undermine the respect for collective agreements and thus the influence of trade unions on wage developments. From the very beginning there was little likelihood that Palme and Feldt would succeed in introducing a lasting high level of productivity without such phenomena of dissolution within the labor market.

If it had not been for the possibility of devaluation, the government would have had to attack the structural problems: the budget deficit, the system of taxation, slackness within the market system. This would have been more difficult politically and would have jeopardized the election victory in 1982 if the measures had been introduced beforehand. The politicians would then themselves have taken the full responsibility instead of leaving the heaviest burden to the trade unions.

The Federation of Trade Unions agreed to the devaluation. That is not what Stig Malm attacks. However, his way of acting may only be understood against the background of the tensions created by the economic policy in the labor market. Exactly as was the case 15 years ago, the entire labor movement may become radicalized in an uncontrollable manner unless its leadership acts in a determined and militant manner in matters essential to the movement.

7262

CSO: 3650/231

SED DELEGATION VISITS SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY

Details of Visit

Zurich NEUE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG in German 15 Jun 84 p 24

/Unsigned Article: "Political 'Collaboration' for Peace by Communist and Social Democratic Parties"/

/Text/ Bue. At the invitation of the Swiss Social Democratic Party /SPS/, a delegation from the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany /SED/ visited Switzerland last week from Monday, 4 June, to Wednesday, 6 June. So far, our Social Democratic Party has failed to inform the Swiss public of this fact, even though hosts and guests issued a joint press release a week ago in which "both sides" advocate "collaboration of communist and social democratic parties, and all others interested in the preservation of peace, in a broad coalition of reason."

Just as 2 years ago, when SPS leaders toured the GDR for several days at the invitation of GDR's SED, the return visit to Switzerland, contemplated at that time, was first reported by the East German party organ (aside from a local item in the Basel ARBEITER ZEITUNG). Last Friday's NEUES DEUTSCHLAND reported from Geneva that the SED Central Committee delegation, headed by Klaus Gaebler, chief of the "Propaganda Department," had met with Helmut Hubacher, SPS chairman; his deputy, Peter Vollmer; Executive Secretary Christoph Berger; as well as other leading members of the SPS. It was further learned that, before its departure last Thursday /sic/, the GDR delegation also met with Jean Spielmann, deputy secretary general of the Communist Party /PdA/.

The East German news agency's dispatch from Geneva also mentioned a joint press release in which both parties "unanimously" stated "that despite differences of opinion on individual issues, at present the paramount task for responsible political action was to bring about a change in direction toward disarmament and the lessening of tensions. In this spirit," it is stated in the item cited above, "both sides were in favor of collaboration of Communist and Social Democratic Parties," as well as others interested in peace, "in a broad coalition" of reason.

Inquiries at the Central Secretariat of the SPS reveal that the formulation concerning the advocacy by both sides "of a collaboration of Communist and Social

Democratic Parties" with regard to the politics of peace, emanates in fact from the joint press release of the SED delegation and the SPS leaders. This press bulletin has not yet been released to the Swiss public. Not, as one was first tempted to believe, because it was lost in the flood of reports about the Pope's visit, but rather because the SPS leaders did not intend to make it public through its party news service until next week, together with some other information about the visit.

Even if one were inclined to interpret this political restraint concerning information—highly unusual for the Social Democrats—as an indication of the "moest" significance that, according to an SPS functionary, the SPS leadership attributes to the visit from the GDR, one cannot escape the conclusion that the Social Democratic Party of our country has once again been shown in a highly questionable light with respect to foreign policy. It is from the East German party organ that the world learns that a ruling party of neutral Switzerland has come out in favor of "collaboration" with Communist Parties in the politics of peace. The same news report also provides the unambiguous "interpretation" of the SED's representatives' view on this commitment to peace, since in the course of the Swiss visit they re-emphasized their determination, together with the Communist Party (PdA), to "increase efforts in the fight against the peace-time armament and confrontation policies of the aggressive imperalist funces of the United States and of NATO"

Under these circumstances, the public--certainly including many SPS voters--must indeed be very curious how, in retrospect, the SPS leadership will attempt to maintain its foreign policy posture and its political credibility. Even though internal political, social and publicity issues and subjects may have dominated discussions and inspection tours during the 3-day visit--Gaebler and the two members of the Central Committee, Heinz Lehmann (Central Committee Department of International Relations) and Gunther Mauersberger visited--among other places--the Basel ARBEITER-ZEITUNG, the Economic Center Langenbruck and the Swiss Social Archives--the foreign and party policy objectives of the GRD representatives and the benefits they will derive are obvious. Besides, such phrases as "collaboration" with Communist parties remain in every respect in need of interpretation, even if their acceptance in a joint bulletin tells already more than enough.

Communique Issued

Zurich NEUE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG in German 21 Jun 84 p 25

/Text/ The press service of the Social Demoratic Party of Switzerland /SPS/ has now published the joint SPS and SED statement concerning the visit of a part delegation from the GDR (see also NEUE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG No 136). The communique reads as follows:

"At the invitation of the Social Democratic Party of Switzerland, a delegation from the Central Committee of the SED, headed by Klaus Gaebler, member of the Central Committee and chief of the propaganda department of the Central Committee of the SED, visited Switzerland during the 1st week in June.

"On 7 June 1984 the delegation met with Helmut Hubacher and other SPS leaders to exchange views on the current international situation, on tasks in the fight to preserve peace and the relationship between the two parties.

"The representatives of the SED and the SPS agreed that—despite differences on specific issues—the paramount task of any current political action was to do everything possible to stop the escalation of armaments, to avert the danger of a nuclear inferno and to bring about a change toward disarmament and a relaxation of tensions. In this spirit, both parties favored the collaboration of Communist and Social Democratic Parties, and all others interested in the preservation of peace, in a broad coalition of reason. The objective is to reduce confrontation and tensions through good will and constructive approaches and to reach agreements on arms control and disarmament.

"The point was emphasized that the SED and the SPS should oppose all steps which would intensify the arms race and increase the danger of nuclear war. Both parties advocate a reduction and eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction. They opt for the creation of nuclear-free zones, the prohibition of chemical warfare weapons and military misuse of space.

"The parties to the discussions expressed their satisfaction with the contacts and the relationship between the SED and the SPS that have evolved so far. They agreed to continue mutual collaboration in the interest of peace and relaxation of tension."

Bue. The politically alert public can only marvel at the political content of the joint declaration agreed on at the occasion of the visit of a high-ranking delegation of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED) with the top leadership of the Social Democratic Party of Switzerland (SPS). The SPS, if one takes the words approved by its leaders literally, is marching in step with the SED in the politics of peace and disarmament. Together with the SED, it opts for a reduction and elimination of all nuclear weapons. The blatant superiority of the Warsaw Pact nations is not mentioned. And the question of what the West should do to create a stabilizing counterbalance against this high buildup of arms after the elimination of all nuclear weapons, does not seem to concern them.

Instead, there is naive talk of a continuation of "mutual collaboration in the interest of peace and the relaxation of tension." The pretense prevails that the SED, and other Communist parties, mean the same thing by peace as do Social Democratic elements in free countries. This, when one could learn from any textbook that the Communist regime does not understand peace as respect for the international status quo with all its controversies, its social differences and political diversity, but regards peace as a state which can only be realized after the establishment of "socialism" as defined by the regime.

The collaboration with the SED, as envisaged in the press release, is therefore political eyewash. Those elements of the Social Democratic Party who think clearly may be asking themselves whether the party leadership under Helmut Hubacher and Peter Vollmer may not have been taken in by a propaganda ploy of

the Eastern Block. Moscow is currently making intense efforts to bring West German and other Social Democrats over into its camp in the politics of peace, while it has broken off its arms control talks with the United States and is staying away from the negotiation table. Moscow's East German deputies seem to have an easy time with the SPS...

Together with the tedious communique the press service distributed an "open letter" in which the SPS leadership urgently "alerts" President of the Confederation Schlumpf, on the occasion of Prime Minister Botha's visit, to pay attention to the "human rights violations in South Africa." How does such a protest jibe with "collaboration" with the SED which is responsible for a regime whose inhumanity is notorious?

12628

CSO: 3620/334

MILITARY

REPORT FROM DEFENSE RESEARCH COUNCIL BACKS SUBMARINE FLEET

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 14 Jun 84 p 3

[Article by Dan Axel: "Problems Will Be Solved in Defense Compromise"]

[Text] The secret report about the Danish submarine defense from the Defense Research Council is now released in resume form: Submarines are better than land-based missile systems as a supplement to the existing sea mine defense.

"There are still some 'important problems' to be solved before the government and the Social Democrats can reach agreement on a total defense compromise. But the will is there, and I still hope that we can present an agreement when the Folketing groups are assembled on 29 June."

This was said by Defense Minister Hans Engell (Conservative) to BERLINGSKE after recent probing with Social Democratic negotiators Poul Sogaard, Knud Damgaard and Kjeld Olesen yesterday.

The concept of a total defense compromise is now accepted by the parties, which agree that the framework of the civil defense should also be included in the discussion. Therefore Hans Engell is maintaining close contact with Minister of the Interior Britta Schall Holberg (Liberal), who is negotiating with the parties on the future of civil defense.

While the Social Democrats want an expansion--also economic--of just the civil defense. 't is more difficult to get unity about the economic level for the military defense and about new procurement for the air force, navy and army.

"I am still optimistic, and probing between the government parties and the Social Democrats will continue--perhaps later in the week, perhaps at the beginning of next week," said Hans Engell.

Submarines

One of the remaining questions between the government and the Social Democrats is whether the navy should build new submarines, if Denmark can lease a submarine solution, or whether we should instead utilize a combined sea

mine/land based missile system for defense against against an attack from the Baltic.

In an unclassified resume of a report from the Defense Research Council—dated December 1982—the submarine solution is preferred, because according to the research council it can also solve problems in peacetime: upholding sovereignty, hidden observation, warning and oceanographic and hydroacoustic observations.

The research council also noted that a missile/sea mine solution would be just as expensive as a submarine solution, in order to have the same defensive capability in a most critical attack.

Although the report is secret, it says in the resume that "NATO countries' submarine presence in the Baltic has an important effect. In its development there is high readiness; it can be deployed to its fighting area at an early stage during a period of increasing tensions without economic, defensive or political consequences."

9287

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MILITARY

RETURN OF TRADITIONAL SECURITY POLICY CONSENSUS UNLIKELY

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 18 Jun 84 p 9

[Article by Monitor: "A Security-Political Compromise?"]

[Text] The new signals from the spokesman for the Social Democratic Party do not mean that it will be easy to reestablish the traditional broad unity in security policy.

After almost 2 years of bitter conflict between the government and the Social Democrats, are we on the way toward reestablishing the traditional broad unity on security policy? Several pronouncements from Svend Auken, political spokesman for the Social Democratic Party, point in that direction. And even though one swallow does not make a summer, the issue is so significant that the new signals should be investigated.

Inspired by the unity which has been achieved between the government and the Labor Party in Norway, Auken has proposed that the government work out a report which will form the basis for thorough discussion in a special Folketing committee, with the intention of reaching the broadest possible unity on the main lines in Denmark's future security policy.

That is the most constructive proposal which has come from the large opposition party in a long time. The idea deserves to be tested, even though it will not be easy to overcome the difficulties which will arise on both sides of the Folketing.

Will it be possible for the Social Democrats to keep in step on this issue? Unfortunately Auken's statement is less the result of an internal democratic decision process in the party than of its leaders' various security-political statements during recent years. It was not uncharacteristic that Jytte Hilden was the first to publicly disagree with Auken. Did Lasse Budtz, Ritt Bjerregaard and—not forgetting—Anker Jorgensen agree on it?

Auken correctly pointed out the special importance that security-political unity has for a small country. But can considerations of national security compete with the personal ambitions of politicians?

Also, on the side of the government and the government parties, will it be possible despite the detailed avowal of traditional unity to overcome the difficulties in entering a real compromise? It is easier to stand aside with clean hands and point to the craftiness of the Social Democrats.

For example, will the foreign minister be able to control his temperament and resist the temptation to make comments during the long trip toward a compromise? Not all the minister's statements have been governed by considerations of the long range goal. The latest was the incident over the issue of Denmark's place on the Security Council. It served no special purpose to raise it, and the result was a politicizing which could only increase the government's difficulties in the United Nations.

Auken's proposal also raises certain problems concerning methods of work in the Folketing. As compared with other issues, foreign policy is not determined primarily by the passage of laws, but by resolutions. That means that issues in the foreign policy area do not require the same preparation, either in the administration or in the Folketing before decisive approval. This has been reasonable, as long as there was broad unity on security policy, and its main lines were unchanged over a long period of years. But during the disunity of recent years, with frequent debates and many resolutions, which were often formulated in haste and approved as the result of a tactical maneuver within and outside the Folketing, the method of work has become clearly unsatisfactory.

Adding to that, because of the circumstances of the majority, security policy is formed by a small circle of opposition politicians who do not have an information or analysis capability of any importance at their disposal. The basis for decisionmaking is incidental and preparation is casual.

The proposal for a new procedure is thus well-founded. But which procedure can be used, when the official report recommended by the prime minister is to be discussed in the Folketing? The Foreign Policy Board, or a special committee appointed as a normal Folketing committee is hardly suitable. A precondition for real compromise discussions is that they can proceed without tactical maneuvering by the parties which are against Denmark's membership in NATO. The 11-man Defense Policy Committee could be a model. But that assumes that the Social Democrat leaders are ready to reject criticism against the procedure from the leftwing in and outside the party. Jytte Hilden is already "a little afraid that there will be a blanket of misunderstanding thrown over the peace efforts that we are trying to conduct."

The decisive factor will naturally be the contents of an eventual compromise about security policy. Svend Auken points to the Norwegian compromise. Rumors of it reached Denmark before detailed reports of its contents, and the rumors were immediately converted to arguments in the Danish debate. However, the Norwegian position is contained in 26 closely printed pages, which take careful positions on two still more comprehensive ideas.

It is an expression of a regular compromise in which the Labor Party and the government parties have yielded to one another. Mostly with regard to Anker Jorgensen's early enthusiasm for the Norwegian position, there is reason to point out a couple of the points in which the Labor Party's policy deviates from the Folketing resolution of 3 May.

On the other hand there is hardly any corresponding need to show how the N wegian position deviates from the Danish Government's optimal wishes. The government has of course so far been willing to swallow anything regardless of the consequences for Denmark's international status, so long as it enhances our parliamentary control reform or the requirement that the civil service loyally serve the sitting government at any time.

Where the Folketing's resolution of 3 May merely speaks of the government working for an international agreement which forbids first use of nuclear weapons, the Norwegian resolution speaks of reducing dependence on nuclear weapons in general and first use in particular, "parallel with greater emphasis being placed on conventional defense." In this connection it can be mentioned that the Labor Party recommended a real growth of three percent in Norwegian defense expenditures.

Where Lasse Budtz through his interpretation has diluted the precise contents of the formulation about a nuclear weapon-free zone in the resolution, the Norwegian position clearly disagrees with a separate Nordic zone. The Danish resolution also speaks about a zone arrangement guaranteed by the United States and the Soviet Union. The Labor Party is against something like that. The party does not wish to give the Soviet Union a legal right to become involved in Norwegian security policy, and important parts of the party reject an equality of status for the importance of the two superpowers to the security of the country, which the Danish formula suggests.

Concerning medium-range missiles there was no unity reached in Norway. However, the Labor Party and the government parties agreed that the Soviet Union should give up its demand that NATO must remove the deployed missiles before negotiations can be resumed. About the freeze of the nuclear weapon arsenals, the resolution says that a freeze must not lead to a serious imbalance in relative strengths, and must not have a negative effect on the negotiating process. These and corresponding conditions show a sense of reality and nuanced attitude in the Labor Party which has been lacking in Social Democratic attitudes in recent years.

Whether a Danish compromise can be found, and what in a given case it will contain, can not be predicted. Anker Jorgensen's public reaction to Svend Auken's statement does not immediately indicate greater cooperativeness.

But even if new unity can be attained, there can not be a complete return to the political lines of former times. Developments in the Social Democratic Party, the Folketing election in January and the government's lack of will to take the normal parliamentary consequences of its declared positions all mean that Danish security policy has changed, and a new unity can only be established on a revised foundation.

9287

CSO: 3613/182

MILITARY DENMARK

BRIEFS

NEW SECURITY AFFAIRS COMMITTEE—Head of department Peter Dyvig of the Foreign Ministry will be head of a small civil service committee which will now prepare a broad and comprehensive report on Denmark's security-political situation. After a debate in the Folketing the report will be the basis for political work with security problems in a Folketing committee. Yesterday the prime minister made the official announcement of the committee on the basis of a recommendation from the political spokesman of the Social Democratic Party, Svend Auken, for a domestic security-political debate. Auken recommended a basic Folketing investigation as the foundation for a debate in a special committee. The government was favorable to the recommendation and there was unity between the government and the Social Democrats that the passage of a continued flow of resolutions on security policy was not a satisfactory way to deal with the problem. [By lk] [Text] [Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 16 Jun 84 p 2] 9287

CSO: 3613/182

GENERAL COPEL INTERVIEWED ON DETERRENCE

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 23 Apr 84 No 17 pp 133-144

[Interview with former head of the Operations Division of the French Air Force Gen Etienne Copel by Dieter Wild of DER SPIEGEL at the magazine's Paris offices: "'Chemical Weapons for the Bundeswehr [FRG Armed Forces]'"]

[Text] Etienne Copel—at age 46 France's youngest general and head of the Operations Division of the Air Force General Staff—caused excitement in mid-March when, having written a book entitled "Vaincre la Guerre [To Conquer War]," he requested to be relieved from active service.

He had been the first high-ranking French officer to question the defense doctrine valid since the time of de Gaulle according to which the country's security rests primarily on the deterrent of the nuclear "force de frappe."

Copel's counterarguments:

- -- Nuclear weapons deter an adversary only from attacking with nuclear weapons.
- --The superiority of an adversary armed to the maximum with conventional and chemical weapons can be offset only with neutron bombs and chemical weapons.
- --While the tactical nuclear weapons developed so far are too dangerous, neutraon bombs are not, provided that they are employed only on one's own territory.
- --A defense along the lines of the Swiss militia system makes more sense than the still customary armed force "of the type of World War II but with nuclear weapons on top of it."

Such deviation from the recognized security dogmas touches a taboo in France about which all parties have been in agreement for 25 years. If on top of it a high-ranking officer engaged in public criticism, he violates a legendary command imposed on his officers by King Louis XV at the Battle of Fontenoy in 1745 and quoted by President Giscard d'Estaing before members of the "Institut des hautes etudes de defense nationale [Institute for Advance Studies of National Defense] in 1976: "Centlemen, I ask you to keep your mouths shut."

This explains why the French public reacted with embarrassment to Copel's heretical theses and the Paris LE MONDE, loyal to the government, gave the critical general the headline of "outsider with stars."

Copel, on the other hand, at 49 and a trained fighter pilot, says: "Deterrence has stifled thought."

SPIEGEL: Mon general, the international of high-ranking military heritics—British General Hackett, the Belgian Close, the German Bastian, U.S. Admiral Larocque—now has a French member: Generel Copel.

Is it only a coincidence that a Frenchman was the last to criticize official military doctrine?

Copel: I don't know whether it is just a coincidence. The fact is that the military doctrine valid at the moment is too dangerous. It risks either nuclear war or subjugation. I just had to state that it was time to do something, because the danger was becoming too great.

SPIEGEL: The French Armed Forces are called the "big silent ones" because their members are not supposed to speak up in public. So if a member of this closed society turns against official military policy, it looks like treason. Have you expressed contempt toward your superiors and your peers?

Copel: Not contempt. And I have a received a great number of letters from my peers agreeing with me.

SPIEGEL: But surely not only letters expressing agreement.

Copel: Believe it or not--I have received only letters expressing agreement. Though I was criticized in the press, I have received much more support than I had expected in letters and telephone calls.

SPIEGEL: Also from among the high ranks?

Copel: Even from former ministers. All approve of my having had the courage to leave the service and that I discuss things objectively. I am convinced that General de Gaulle would never have retained such an ossified doctrine, but this doctrine has remained untouched here for 25 years. It is time to note that the world has changed.

SPIEGEL: You attack what the French have been regarding as a sacred element of their security—the "force de frappe" doctrine. You say that this doctrine could involve "France in the catastrophe." That really is something.

Copel: Well, that is why I quit. Not only France but Europe could be involved in the catastrophe if the nuclear deterrent is to achieve everything, because in that case one ends up with...

SPIEGEL: ...blunders?

Copel: Yes, with blunders. For instance, the following: It seems highly disproportionate to me to want to guard against a conventional or chemical attack with nuclear weapons which one fires with one blow at central Europe, for that way one kills many friends while the effect on the enemy is very small.

SPIEGEL: You call it an "apocalyptical bluff" to want to ward off a conventional attack with nuclear weapons. But is not any kind of deterrence with nuclear weapons an "apocalyptical bluff" because it in fact means that one can deter the adversary by threatening one's own suicide?

Copel: I think it is quite normal to say to one's adversary: If you attack me with nuclear weapons, I will avenge myself and respond with nuclear weapons.

SPIEGEL: To avenge oneself--does that still make sense in the nuclear age?

Copel: Revenge is perhaps not nice; it is the biblical law of retribution. But retribution is part of human nature.

SPIEGEL: I avenge myself by perishing myself--Is that supposed to deter someone?

Copel: In my opinion, I do not perish, you see, because if the attacker knows that I will avenge myself, he is not going to attack. I am quite sure of that. Let us mention names. If Russia wanted to decide to attack France with nuclear weapons, it would have to be prepared for a corresponding answer. So Russia won't do it. If, however, Russia wanted to attack with conventional weapons, it could say to itself: The French will not dare respond with nuclear weapons and thus run the risk of a nuclear war. Therefore the Russians might attack in that case.

SPIEGEL: How, then, do you explain the fact that it has been official NATO doctrine for many years that it is definitely possible to deter the Russians, with their enormous conventional strength, with Western nuclear weapons?

Copel: One does perhaps have to acknowledge the fact that this has worked for a long time: there has been no war. But probably the only reason why it has worked is that the Russians have had no reason to risk an attack. I think it is dangerous, however, that this theory makes it impossible to prepare for a careful defense in order to ward off a conventional attack with conventional means.

SPIEGEL: You criticize the fact that the president of the French Republic in the event of an attack with conventional weapons might face the fateful alternative of "submission or annihilation." Surely this has been known for quite some time.

Copel: What I advocate would avoid both: one must not react with nuclear weapons except to a nuclear attack.

SPIEGEL: You write: "To destroy Moscow means to cause the destruction of Paris." In light of this alternative, would one not have to prefer not to let oneself be annihilated in order to rise again one day, as the pacifists recommend?

Copel: If one has a doctrine which does not only know nuclear deterrence, one will be able to avoid annihilation in my opinion. For I do not believe that the Russians will attack with nuclear weapons. If we--Americans, French and British--do not respond to a conventional attack with nuclear weapons, there will be no nuclear war. In other words, I believe that one can avoid both annihilation and submission. But if I had to choose, I would indeed prefer submission and then organize my defense in order to win one day after all.

SPIEGEL: You proceed from the hypothesis that the Soviet Union would wage an attack with the weapon category in which it is overwhelmingly superior—chemical weapons. You say that in this field the capacity of the Russians is 10 times as great as that of the Americans, that the Russians have a chemical fighting force 100,000 men strong. Are these confirmed figures?

Copel: Yes, I think that not even the Russians dispute them. Of course I have not counted the Russians' poison grenades. But it is known full well that every Soviet regiment has a certain percentage of such grenades. Neither the French nor the Germans have such a thing, and the Americans only very little of it.

SPIEGEL: Is it really feasible that the Soviet Union would deliberately employ a weapon which has been proscribed since World War I and which even Hitler did not dare use?

Copel: Hitler did not use any gas because the British and French had a great deal of it. And there was really not time in World War II when Hitler could have a gained a lot by using gas. On the other hand, he knew that he would inflict a great deal of harm on himself.

SPIEGEL: You propose to offset the Soviet superiority in chemical weapons by corresponding armanent in the West. Do you really think it is possible to persuade public opinion in the West to accept such a disgusting weapon?

Copel: First of all, I would like to protect our own population, to equip it with gas masks and protective wraps. I would like to persuade public opinion in my country and in yours, in Italy and the Netherlands that this could be done as early as tomorrow. That is the highest of all priorities; it is the only way to avoid panic. If you have a gas mask and a protective wrap you do not die from gas but calmly go to your cellar. In 1940 my mother took her gas mask along when she fled.

SPIEGEL: But the moral resistance against preparing to wage chemical warfare will remain.

Copel: There is no reason to look upon a war with chemical weapons as a war as dramatic as a war with nuclear weapons which could blow up the entire globe. In the event of a war with chemical weapons, not even Europe would be blown up. One would have to take the corresponding protective measures.

SPIEGEL: You also recommend chemical weapons of retaliation, however.

Copel: I know very well that it will be difficult to make that clear. But I do not hesitate to say that I even would give the Germans chemical weapons to enable them to defend themselves against an attack with chemical weapons. Germany would not be the first to employ them any more than France. There does not exist any right to be the first to use chemical weapons, but there definitely exists a right to possess them.

For that reason the Soviets do not conceal them or perhaps deny having any. If one wants to prevent a war with chemical weapons, one must not close one's eyes to it.

SPIEGEL: You then criticize the French military doctrine for its tactical nuclear weapons whose employment, according to the prevailing doctrine, is to serve as a "final warning" to an aggressor. You say that this doctrine is "dangerous beyond any reasonable bounds." Why?

Copel: Because it is certain that if this doctrine was applied one would attract a counterblow against one's own country, and a very heavy one at that. Apart from that, one would kill a great many civilians—whether West Germans, East Germans of Poles—but a particularly great number of soldiers, because the Soviet Union has not forgotten the blitzkrieg. In other words, it will withdraw its troops from wherever our tactical nuclear weapons are aimed at, and there will be a great many civilians there instead.

SPIEGEL: Do you think that once tactical nuclear weapons have been employed one can in fact still prevent the supersize nuclear war?

Copel: No. Once 150 or 200 nuclear warheads are detonated, each of which is as big as the Hiroshima bomb, the great war is there.

SPIEGEL: In lieu of the tactical nuclear weapons in vogue so far, you recommend something which also makes one shudder--neutron bombs. "True," you write, "there will be losses, but they will be limited." Do you think this is also true if these bombs are launched against an aggressor who is already located in our big cities?

Copel: If you will, neutron bombs are really defensive weapons.

SPIEGEL: I beg your pardon?

Copel: The neutron bombs I have in mind, you see, are not launched at a single blow but one by one against enemy troop concentrations and after a target has been sighted. You see 10 Soviet tanks approach and launch a neutron bomb against them. The enormous advantage of this weapon is that the beams penetrate the hard material of a tank but not "soft" material, such as the concrete ceiling of a cellar. A civilians in his cellar comes out of it unharmed.

SPIEGEL: It is better not to rely on that.

Copel: Sure, if the bomb explodes across the street, the beams penetrate. But if it explodes on the outskirts of a village, the people come out of their cellars unharmed.

SPIEGEL: But all that is theory, isn't it?

Copel: I too would prefer there not being any war. Nevertheless I think that with the neutron bome one would have a militarily effective weapon because it primarily kills the attackers. So it is possible to make a contribution to preventing war. I do realize, though, that in light of public opinion I would have problems with considering chemical and neutron weapons.

SPIEGEL: You would not only find it hard to persuade the Germans, but in France too you would hardly find any politicians supporting the production of neutron bombs.

Copel: No, I don't think so. In France people are beginning to realize that the neutron bomb is a defensive weapon.

SPIEGEL: Because it keeps things standing but kills people, it remains a contemptible weapon.

Copel: So say the Communists, under Moscow's influence. Of course I would prefer this weapon to be able to annihilate tanks and not the people in

the tanks. But it happens to be more difficult to destroy a tank. The statement that the neutron bomb saves things and kills people should be amended to read: "The neutron bomb spares friendly civilians and kills enemy soldiers."

SPIEGEL: After all, the neutron bomb is also a nuclear weapon, with whose employment one crosses the threshold. Why do you think that its employment could prevent total nuclear war more easily than the employment of current tactical nuclear weapons?

Copel: Not so much because it is a question of neutron bombs as because I say: I will employ these weapons exclusively on my own soil. That is probably my most important idea: limiting the war by making it clear to the enemy that I am not coming into his territory, that I am not attacking with nuclear means, but that I will defend myself with every means on my own soil. Understand me right, please: I would perfer not to use any nuclear weapons, but I would like to offset the enemy's superiority in conventional weapons with neutron bombs which I will employ only on my own soil.

SPIEGEL: What do you think the people in the east of France are likely to say when they find out that French neutron bombs would fall on them?

Copel: I think the people in the east of France, as well as the Germans, will understand if we manage to make it clear to them that it is a question of the weapon which would restore the balance without the risk of any nuclear weapons falling on them.

SPIEGEL: And if one does not manage to do so?

Copel: Look, neutron bombs launched against a group of tanks advancing through the Black Forest or the Vosges, as a sighted target—surely that is better than, with the employment of current tactical nuclear weapons of the West, to risk a retaliatory strike by the USSR against our cities, for instance Bonn or Strasbourg.

SPIEGEL: Do you really still consider all that to be realistic?

Copel: Of course it would be better if there was no war and no neutron bombs were used. If there is no way out, however, this seems to me more feasible than anything else. If I were president of the French Republic I would tell Mr Chernenko: I believe I have the right to employ all my weapons against your tank divisions advancing toward my territory. But to say "If your tank divisions advance toward my territory I will destroy Moscow"—that I think lacks credibility.

SPIEGEL: The principle of employing nuclear weapons only on one's own soil would have to lead to the withdrawal of all U.S. nuclear weapons from Europe. What is your answer to this objection?

Copel: One might say that the tactical nuclear weapons of the United States in Europe contribute to deterring the Soviet Union from an attack with nuclear weapons...

SPIEGEL: ...in which, however, you do not believe, do you?

Copel: I have not yet thought about everything. I still have to do some thinking to enable me to take a clear stand in this question. But that the present French tactics are bad—that I am sure of.

SPIEGEL: You do not even rule out the possibility of neutron bombs being made available to the Federal Republic.

Copel: Only if the Federal Republic wishes to. The German Federal Chancellor would have to request the French president to make neutron bombs available to him for the defense of Germany.

SPIEGEL: These weapons would not come into German hands?

Copel: They would not come into the hands of German soldiers; they would be handled by French ones.

SPIEGEL: How is such a thing supposed to proceed?

Copel: Let us again assume a breakthrough by the Soviet Army accomplished with the use of chemical weapons. That would occur on your territory. I could very well imagine the German Federal Chancellor saying to the French president on the telephone: "We are being attacked; can you send me some regiments with neutron bombs by helicopter? Then one would only need to have the civilians to go to their cellars and could stop a further advance by the Soviets with the help of the French neutron bombs. To strike a blow without any kind of agreement with those affected, as is provided for now, seems absurd to me.

SPIEGEL: According to your model, the targets of the French troops lent to Germany are determined by the French?

Copel: No. The Germans Federal Chancellor would tell the French: You will aim here or there, you will aim not at the cities but at the Russian tanks advancing over there.

SPIEGEL: We are infinitely far removed from such a procedure.

Copel: I cannot imagine that a French president would fire a nuclear weapon into the territory of his best ally without his agreement.

SPIEGEL: But the French Pluton missiles, for instance, now would be dropped exclusively on German soil, would they not?

Copel: Yes, the Pluton missiles and also the tactical nuclear weapons of our air forces. But, you see, I cannot imagine such nuclear weapons being fired at the territory of an ally without the latter having been heard.

SPIEGEL: If you regard the right to assent of the German Government to the employment of nuclear weapons on its territory as "at least legitimate"—such a demand on the part of Germany surely would cause an uproar among the entire Western alliance.

Copel: The Italians have the same problem as you have. You see, I do not find it anomalous for a sovereign country not to have the possibility to reject the use of nuclear weapons on its territory. You are a sovereign country. Under the existing circumstances, I think the so-called two-key system would be quite a good one.

SPIEGEL: But not only is it difficult to implement; many Germans do not want the second key at all.

Copel: I have discussed this extensively with a German general who is a friend of mine. I will not tell you his name. I asked him: Why in fact don't you Germans want the second key? He replied: Because it would not only allow us to say no but because we would then also have to contemplate saying yes, and we do not want to be induced to say yes. As for me, it is nevertheless true that the important thing is to be able to say no.

SPIEGEL: You make this further criticism: "We have an army such as we had in World War II but with nuclear weapons superimposed." Instead you recommend an army on the Swiss pattern, without large vulnerable units, consisting of small troop formations—the "forces armees de l'interieur." Even with excellent equipment, could such a militia—type system really stop the attack of tank divisions of a determined aggressor?

Copel: I definitely think so. I am convinced that neither your army nor ours could invade Switzerland. The system of the Swiss is absolutely homogenous. They defend themselves where they live; all roads are mined; the explosives are on location, and the positions for employing bazookas are known; they have guns with telescopic sights; they are in a position to fight in the towns, on the plain, in the mountains.

SPIEGEL: Many of your countrymen consider you a dreamer....

Copel: Yes, yes. I don't understand why the French could not do the same as the Swiss. If we had this system from the Netherlands to the deepest south of Italy, the Russians would not invade.

SPIEGEL: You write: "If war is evil, nuclear war is evil in the extreme." You call the pacifists "less dangerous than the incorrigible warriors and unconditional bards of retaliation against cities." Gen Pierre Gallois, the chief thinker of de Gaulle's nuclear strategy, therefore reproached you for having "fallen into the trap of the pacifists," though your theses about chemical and neutron weapons of course are anything but pacifist. What is your reply to comrade Gallois?

Copel: If he thinks I am a pacifist, let him. The pacifists have an ideal which is also mine—to avoid war. But I think that the method of the pacifists is wrong, for whoever does not defend himself has every prospect of being attacked. Incidentally, the antinuclear movement is often confused with the pacifist movement. There exists an antinuclear movement about whose members one cannot say by any means that they do not want to defend themselves.

SPIEGEL: Do you consider yourself close to the antinuclear movement?

Copel: I want to reduce the influence of nuclear weapons, and I want more and more people to understand that if one does not want to be attacked one has to defend oneself on one's own territory. I would like to encourage the mentioned idealistic movements; I welcome them. But they have to be made to understand that if they participate in the defense of their countries they help prevent war. I hope to make them understand that the neutron bomb, as I have said, is in fact a defensive weapon.

SPIEGEL: There is quite a strong protest movement against nuclear weapons in Germany, in the Netherlands and in Britain. Why not in France?

Copel: Because our nuclear weapons are ours. The British protest movement, incidentally, is also rather weak as regards British nuclear weapons but stronger as regards U.S. nuclear weapons. Besides, France has had its nuclear weapons for 25 years now, and all parties are almost equally in agreement with that. But I think the protest against the doctrine will now begin.

SPIEGEL: Your book "To Conquer War" was called the "Copel bomb" by a French newspaper. Another paper wrote that your theses "make the general staffs shudder." Nevertheless one gets the impression that the French public does not want to discuss your theses appropriately. Is the heretic being punished by being disregarded?

SPIEGEL: I think my theses will slowly be heeded. My book is not selling badly; I have never seen a military book selling so well. It is having an effect on public opinion.

SPIEGEL: It has been compared to the famous book "Vers l'armee de metier" [Toward a Professional Army], in which Charles de Gaulle in 1934 foresaw the breakthroughs of tank divisions....

Copel: I do not consider myself a de Gaulle, not by any means. But there is a point where I would like to be better than de Gaulle, whose persuasion came too late. I would like to persuade in advance. It is very urgent to do something, and one can do it.

SPIEGEL: You played down your attack a little when you wrote: "I am not spitting into the soup." You immediately poured out the soup by raising your hand against national taboos.

Copel: I am attacking ideas; I would like to change the defense of my country, and also a little the defense of my neighbors. I do attack taboos, but I do so in a measured way. I love the Air Force; that is still where my friends are. The defense minister said: "There is no 'affaire Copel'; that fellow Copel is a citizen, and he says what he thinks."

So the minister is not mad at me. And everyone tells me: You are right to force us to have doubts.

SPIEGEL: You have called deterrence "a mental Maginot Line." Why is it a "mental Maginot line"?

Copel: We are taking refuge behind our "force de frappe" the same way as France hid behind the Maginot Line in the past. At that time we did not have the right army for our policies. If one had alliances with Czechoslovakia and with Poland, one needed an army to immediately strike a blow against Hitler. But at that time we had no tank armies; we had a defensive army.

Today it is exactly the other way round. No one plans to march against Moscow; everybody knows that. We say quite clearly that we will never come to the aid of the Czechs or the Poles, that they will have to confront the Russians on their own. We therefore would not need an offensive army, but we have one nevertheless.

SPIEGEL: You criticize the dangerous excessive armament of the big powers. The present reequipment of the French "force de frappe," however, is raising the nuclear warheads on French missiles from 80 in 1984 to 590 in 1994. Is that not excessive? Is that not crazy?

Copel: One has to know that the Soviets shortly will be able to intercept part of our missiles, and then our threat will lose credibility. I do think, though, that 500 or 600 nuclear warheads are quite a lot. I think we have thus reached a level which need not be raised any further.

SPIEGEL: But you are not against that level?

Copel: I am not really against it.

SPIEGEL: To question the official military doctrine while heading the Operations Division of the Air Force General Staff, after almost 30 years' service and with the best prospects regarding a future career—that is something. Yet the question arises why you did not rebel before.

Copel: Because I had not understood. For a start, a pilot would like to fly. I had beautiful planes; I loved them. I was squadron commander, wing commander, commandant of an air base. I was busy, I had an interesting profession, and I said to myself: There are superiors who think, and when they demand one thing or another of us, it is bound to be a good thing. I did not ponder matters a great deal, though. I did not start wondering until 3 or 4 years ago.

SPIEGEL: After publication of your book you voluntarily quit active service. No more flying.

Copel: Of course I regret it a great deal not to be able to fly any more. For a moment I even had the absurd notion of publishing my book under a pseudonym. That would have made it possible for me to stay in the Air Force. But that would not have been right; that would not have been honest. I have even been asked: Why didn't you wait 5 years? By that time you would have been Air Force chief of staff.

SPIEGEL: Why didn't you wait?

Copel: Simply because there is not much time to lose. People are beginning to comprehend that there is a problem.

SPIEGEL: Thank you for this interview, mon general.

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ECONOMIC EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

NORDIC COUNTRIES HEADING TOWARD POPULATION DECLINE

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 7 Jun 84 p 5

[Article from UPI by Samuel Perry: "Scandinavia Looking For a Way to Have More Babies"]

[Text] Stockholm, June--The Scandinavians, afraid that their culture is doomed to extinction, are trying to find a remedy for the anticipated enormous decline in population growth that set in with the sexual revolution and the emancipation of women.

Despite the bonuses for having children, official statistics predict an alarming decline in the birth rate, as a result of which the population of Scandinavia, now 22 million, may shrink drastically.

In Denmark--a country with one of the lowest birth rates in the world--it appears from statistics published in April, that the population, which now numbers five million members, may be halved within a century.

The net population growth in Norway amounted to only 0.2 percent last year, the lowest rate since the famine of the Napoleonic wars, according to the Norwegian Central Bureau of Statistics. The Finnish daily newspaper HELSINGIN SANOMAT recently predicted that "around the year 3000 the last of the Finnish Mohicans will be living here."

Sweden, too, is worried and has hired experts to study how the model welfare-state will be able to survive a drastic 'aging' of the population without too many hardships and how the current tendency might be reversed. The Swedish sociologist Rita Liljestrom recently wrote in "Children," a book published by the government: "The new methods of birth control have led to a dissolution of the old pattern of propagation. Being able to independently limit the size of one's family was introduced as one of the rights of man, but voluntary family planning has its limitations," says Liljestrom, who argues that there are "well-founded reasons for putting restraints on this freedom." "A system of fixed annual birth quotas would be preferable," according to Liljestrom.

With the emancipation of women and the high cost of living, a situation has arisen where married couples often both work and postpone or abandon the decision to have children, a tendency that is reinforced by the lack of daycare centers for Scandinavian children.

The Scandinavian authorities are afraid that the birth rate will continue to decline and the disruption in balance between the age groups will lead to a shrinking number of working people having to care for a steadily growing number of old people. "We will have great numbers of old people, especially in the age group of 80 and over, who will need care and support, but who will care for them?" asks Professor Lars Wallo, chairman of the Norwegian ad hoc population commission.

The Scandinavians are now seeking possibilities for arising the birth rate of the indigenous population. They would rather not admit large numbers of new immigrants to keep their numerical strength up. The governments have decided for more measures supporting families in order to promote having children, even though, on other fronts, the benefits of the welfare-state are being axed.

Sweden has taken the lead in the field of experiments with parentage leave, where the mother or the father stay home for the first nine months after a birth and are fully paid throughout. In its most recent budget, Sweden gave support for families the highest priority and hopes to thus induce families to have more children.

Some experts, however, do not think much of this idea. They say that already existing families will indeed profit financially from this, but that only a few parents will have more children in hopes of becoming rich that way. They argue that decisions about the number of children cannot be manipulated by the government.

Dr Ritta Jallinoja of the University of Helsinki said: "There would have to be a national emergency of sorts before women would start bearing children in the interest of the general good."

12507

CSO: 3614/94

ECONOMIC

LABOR MINISTRY EXPECTS EMPLOYMENT FIGURE IMPROVEMENT BY 1990

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 13 Jun 84 p 9

[Unsigned article: "No Letup in Unemployment Until End of 1980s"]

[Text] The Labor Ministry's planning division estimates that the employment situation will not improve in the next few years, although the number of jobs will rise. The reason is that the labor supply will remain high. On the other hand, the ministry expects a brighter situation at the end of the decade, because the number of those entering the job market will drop, repatriation will decrease, and participation in work will not grow.

The employment problem was up for consideration Tuesday at the government's ministerial committee on economic policy. It was noted in the discussion that in spite of a possible turnaround taking place in the general work situation the problem of the untrained and long-term unemployed remains. In the future, attention will be focused on it in the government.

According to advance information for May, when lognest declined characteristically for the season. There were 115,000 unemployed in May, while the number a month earlier was 144,000. Thus the unemployment level sank one percent. Unemployment from May of last year decreased only 0.3 percent, however.

According to the Labor Ministry's report the number of those working has grown swiftly in recent years, although at the same time unemployment has remained high. New jobs also came into being during the recession. The demand for labor has grown the last five years.

In the years 1979-83 the number of those working increased by 190,000 persons. According to the ministry, such a good-sized improvement in employment was not even made during the overheated boom of the first half of the 1970s. Nevertheless, according to statistics, unemployment only declined by about 15,000 persons from the peak year of 1978.

Employment has grown primarily in the service industries. This year and next year the demand for labor may rise because of the boom, and the demand may continue above all in the service industries.

It is predicted that the slight upswing and the downtrend in unemployment accompanying it will continue in 1984 and 1985.

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ECONOMIC

INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION UP 10 PERCENT IN FIRST QUARTER

Reykjavík MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 9 Jun 84 p 2

[Article: "Industrial Economic Indicator 1984: Industrial Production Increased by Ten Percent in First Quarter"]

[Text] The industrial production in the country increased by 10 percent during the first quarter compared with the same time last year, or by 6 percent if a large increase in aluminum and ferrosilicon production is not included. This came forth, among other things, in a quarterly study conducted by the Federation of Icelandic Master Craftsman and the Federation of Icelandic Manufacturers of the situation and prospects in Icelandic industry covering 91 companies and 24 industrial areas. Other main conclusions of the Industrial Economic Indicator are that there is a 5 percent total industrial increase when comparing the industrial production during the first quarter of this year compared with the previous three months (that is the fourth quarter of 1983), but about 7 percent if a reduction in aluminum production is not included. The sale of industrial goods was also greater in general during the first quarter than during the same time last year but because of less aluminum sales, the sale of industrial goods remained practically the same. However, there were more production orders in industry than at the turn of last year. At that time, supplies of produced goods had increased but the increase in supplies was mostly the result of increased aluminium supplies. Moreover, the collection of sales receipts was about the same as it had been during the previous three months.

According to the study, further comparison of the industrial production during the first quarter of this year with the same time last year shows that the development has been favorable in most industries. The number of industries in which the production decreased is also lower. For example, the production of aluminum and ferrosilicon increased considerably. There was also an increase in the production within some branches of the food industry; woolen goods and pelt production; paper goods production; paint production; glass industry and soap and detergent production. The production also increased somewhat in the wood industry and in metal working and machine repair. The production decreased, however, in the fishing gear industry, mineral production and shipbuilding.

[News Release]

9583

CSO: 3626/25

EXPERT SEES MORE NATURAL GAS, LOWER PRICES IN WEST EUROPE

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 6 Jun 84 p 11

[Article: "Odell: Gas Prices May Decline Sharply If Production Increases"]

[Text] Amsterdam, 6 June--The price of natural gas in Europe may go down considerably. Gas may then significantly increase its share of the West European energy market at the expense of oil and coal. This was argued yesterday by Professor Peter Odell, director of the Rotterdam Center for International Energy Studies, at a conference on gas turbines in Amsterdam.

Professor Odell repeated the expectation he had earlier expressed that the natural gas industry will be 50 percent larger than today by the year 2000 and that the price of natural gas will be one half to one third cheaper on the average than at the moment.

West Europe, according to Odell, has a 'gas bubble' (gas surplus) of appreciably greater size and longer life than the United States. "The proven and probable gas reserves are sufficient for more than forty years of production at the current level and that period is still continuing to grow. New gas finds and the revaluation of known fields will add more to the reserves than is being used at the moment."

Moreover, said the Rotterdam energy expert, the current and future exporters of natural gas to West Europe have such large reserves that they will try to increase their share of the market here with competitive prices. Odell was alluding primarily to the Soviet Union and Algeria, but—in a somewhat more long-term perspective—to Nigeria and countries in the Middle East as well.

Assuming that the price is right, gas can replace oil and coal not only in direct consumption but also as a fuel for generating electricity, Odell believes. He pointed out the growth in heat-and-power units, above all in industry and the public heat and electricity supplies. Gas-fired compressors, according to Odell, also offer attractive possibilities for replacing electricity.

Once again, Professor Odell pointed out that the West European governments, in fear of--among other things--energy shortages, have kept the production of natural gas artificially too low and the price too high. Fortunately, the authorities are now starting to realize that they have to stimulate their gas production and exports, even if it will be only to keep up their revenues from natural gas, said Odell.

Odell blames West Europe's lag in gas production on the fact that the natural gas industry is controlled to a very large degree by a combination of state enterprises and large oil companies. Says Odell: "Such a combination would be perceived by most observers in America as 'highly suspicious' because of the way in which they would be able to manipulate the consumers."

12507

CSO: 3614/95

BALTIC COMMISSION REPORT: FERTILIZERS HURTING SEA

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 12 Jun 84 p 10

[Article by Antti Vahtera: "New Cause of Concern for Researchers: Too Much Agricultural Fertilizer Flows Into Baltic Sea"]

[Text] Eutrophication of the Baltic Sea has begun to arouse greater and greater concern among researchers. The phenomenon results from the fact that the flow of nutrients containing nitrogen and phosphorous into the sea has increased. A substantial part of these are fertilizers used in agriculture.

Eutrophication was the central topic at the recently concluded conference in Karlskrona, Sweden. It is part of the seminar work supported by the Baltic Sea states. Finland's representative at the conference was Aarno Voipio, outgoing secretary general of the Baltic Sea Commission.

The conference participants' views on the condition of the Baltic Sea fluctuated considerably, according to Voipio. Eutrophication was firmly in the foreground, and according to some participants it may turn out to be fateful for the Baltic Sea.

Accordingly, the most pessimistic experts predicted that the Baltic Sea's life in its entirety will become impoverished, the number of worthless fish will grow at the expense of valuable fish, and the number of biologically dead sea-bottom areas will increase. It will happen this way unless the amount of nutrients flowing into the sea is reduced.

Agriculture's Share Greater than Expected

Professor Voipio does not take such a pessimistic stand. He believes that deductions of this kind are made much too unhesitatingly on the basis of the model given by lake eutrophication. The matter has long interested researchers, because eutrophication is no new phenomenon.

"On the basis of investigations we can conclude, however, that more should be done to prevent eutrophication of the Baltic Sea. Changes in the fish population may be possible later in the future, although the only change observed for the time being has been an increase in the herring population," states Voipio. Every year enormous amounts of nitrogen and phosphorus, which chiefly cause eutrophication, flow into the Baltic Sea. At Karlskrona, research results were disclosed according to which the annual amounts are 77,000 tons of phosphorus and 1.2 million tons of nitrogen. Half of these amounts enter the Baltic Sea along with flowing watercourses.

"It is not enough that attention is focused only on population centers' wastewaters, which we have already managed to reduce substantially," says Voipio. "It is obvious that agriculture's share is greater than we have wanted to believe up until now."

According to the investigations presented at Karlskrona, roughly one fourth of the material floating in the Baltic Sea comes from agriculture. The question about how great an amount of nitrogen from fertilizers flows into the sea depends a lot on the place and the time.

"In Denmark, where artificial fertilization is practiced on flat ground and where the duration time is short, as much as one third of the used nitrogen gets into the sea," states Voipio. "Then again, in Kuusamo, scarcely any of the fertilizer nitrogen is conveyed into the sea."

Necessary to Reduce Discharges

"Selection of the current moment in time is also important. Lasting quality is greater the nearer the productive period fertilization is carried out. There is no time for the fertilizers to be washed away if the plants get to use them quickly."

The most effective method, however, would be reduction of the use of fertilizers, notes Voipio. It is plainly necessary to see to it that discharges are decreased, but this presupposes harmonious collaboration among the states of the Baltic Sea.

Although in general that cooperation has progressed well, it has on no account been free of problems. One fundamental problem is that not all the countries have the same funds to spend on Baltic Sea protection as, for example, Finland and Sweden, notes Voipio.

"Our task is to slowly make the Baltic Sea countries ripe for action. If we begin to pressure some country which has neglected its obligations, it may dissociate itself from the entire agreement."

Acute Dangers Fended Off

Surveying the entire balance sheet of Baltic Sea protection, Voipio notes that certain acute danger factors have been fended off. Accordingly, the amounts of two dangerous environmental poisons, DDT and PCB, have diminished, as a result of which the threatened seal and sea eagle populations have slowly started to recover.

"The situation is thus partly relieved particularly by the prompt treatment of exigent problems," notes Professor Voipio. "New problems have come in its place, however, or it might be better to say that we are now dealing with problems which do not have such a direct influence as poisons. Eutrophication, which in a way is linked to the general state of health of the Baltic Sea, is one of this kind."

And what about acid rain? According to Professor Voipio, it does not directly affect the marine environment, because in the sea there are substances which neutralize tremendous quantities of acid. But it may have an influence indirectly, loosening from the soil heavy metals which flow into the sea.

In the light of the current situation the dead sea-bottom areas are at the maximum number, in Voipio's view. Only some catastrophic change could expand them.

Professor Voipio bids farewell to the Baltic Sea Commission at the end of June to return to the marine research institute. In his place as new secretary general comes Professor Harald Velner of Soviet Estonia.

12327

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AIR POLLUTION FROM SOUTH AFFECTING GREENLAND

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 18 Jun 84 p 10

[Article by Michael Rastrup Smith: "Auto Exhaust From South Pollutes Green-land"]

[Text] The atmosphere over Greenland and the Arctic is far from being as clean as was previously believed.


That was disclosed by a comprehensive investigation by the Environmental Control Air Pollution Laboratory in Greenland from 1979 to the end of 1982, which was reported in "Forskning i Gronland" [Research in Greenland].

The conclusion of the investigation was that air over the Arctic is very clean in the summer, and polluted in winter. In summer the pollution content of the investigated air is often 100 times less than the levels outside of cities in Denmark. Beginning in October pollution rises very fast, however, and it usually culminates in March, when the values are 20-50 times higher than in the summer.

The clean air in the summer is due to a polar front which protects the Arctic. The wide rain belt of the front washes the air clean before it reaches the polar area. In the winter the picture is changed, however, and the polar front is so far south that the great industrial centers of Europe and other places lie within the front, and in this way the pollution comes into the polar area unhindered.

Such extreme variation in pollution as was measured over Greenland is unknown in other places in the world. In Denmark the winter levels are about double the summer levels, for example.

The special winter pollution attracted attention after Arctic haze was observed in Alaska in the winter. The haze goes from ground level up to 1,000-3,000 meters high. In areas with this haze the great Arctic visibility is reduced from several hundred kilometers to about one-tenth of that.



Caption: This much lead—which among other things comes from automobile exhaust—was contained in the air over Greenland in 1979 and 1980. Measurements confirm that the pollution moves in over the Arctic, especially in the winter.

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